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Environmental Law
by W. Scott Laseter*
and
Julie V. Mayfield*
Perhaps in recognition of the growing prevalence of environmental
issues in the day-to-day practice of law, this Article departs from the
two-year survey period of its predecessors' by covering only decisions
handed down during 1997. Nonetheless, the survey period saw several
interesting cases reach the Eleventh Circuit, including the appeal of a
sua sponte assault on the constitutionality and retroactive application
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Acts and an effort to use the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to
block timber harvest in a national forest.' Further, the survey period
saw the continued emphasis on citizens' suits, the use of the Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement power to repair wetlands, and
the use of criminal provisions to enforce federal environmental law.4
In terms of organization, this Article begins with a discussion of the
decision under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-

* Partner in the firm ofKilpatrick Stockton, member of the Environmental and Natural
Resoures Section, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the South (B.A., Psychology, 1984);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1990). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1988-1990).
** Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton, member of the Environmental and
Natural Resources Section, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson College (B.A., cum laude, Religion,
1989); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with distinction, 1996). Emory International
Law Review, Executive Articles Editor (1995-1996).
1. See W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 48 MERCER L. REV.
1577 (1997); W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1359 (1995);
Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 44 MERCER L. REv. 1187
(1993); Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV.
1411 (1991)).
2. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997).
4. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
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tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 5 then reviews three cases decided
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),6 and concludes with a discussion
Circuit's first opinion on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of the Eleventh
7
("MBTA").
I.

COMPREHENSVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND

LIABILITY ACT

Perhaps the most widely watched environmental decision by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals during the survey period came in
United States v. Olin Corp.' in which the court considered a 1996
decision by the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 9 that
declared CERCLA did not apply retroactively and, moreover, that the
statute was an unconstitutional overextension of Congress's power under
In light of the otherwise unanimous view
the Commerce Clause.'
taken by courts across the country that CERCLA is both constitutional
and retroactive," the Eleventh Circuit surprised no one in reversing
the trial court's decision.' 2
To review the facts of the case,' 3 Olin Corporation ("Olin") operated
a chemical manufacturing plant in Alabama from 1951 to 1982 that

5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986 & Supp. 1998).
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
8. 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
9. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
10. Id. at 1519, 1523 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
11. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); HRW Systems v.
Washington Gas, 823 F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.,
748 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Kelley v. Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich.
1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chem. &
Plastics, 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448
(D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Town
of Boonton v. Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064
(D. Colo. 1985); Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling Disposal Co., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v,
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio
1983); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991); In the Matter of Penn Central, 944 F.2d 164
(3d Cir. 1991); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Kramer, 757
F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
12. Olin, 107 F.3d at 1508.
13. For a discussion of the district court decision, see W. Scott Laseter & Julie V.
Mayfield, Environmental Law, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1577, 1590-91 n.113 (1997).
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contaminated both the soil and groundwater on'the property.1" The
site was listed on the National Priorities List in 1984, and investigatory
work began at the site in 1993 to determine the extent of the contamination."5 Olin and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") later entered into a consent decree that required Olin to
remediate the property and pay all costs incurred by the government."6
The questions concerning CERCLA's constitutionality and retroactivity
arose when the EPA and Olin submitted the proposed consent decree to
the district court for approval and, instead of approving the consent
decree as expected, Judge Hand, sua sponte, decided that "rather than
signing the consent decree, [the court] must dismiss the action both
because 1) Congress did not clearly express its intent that the liability
provision of CERCLA be retroactive ...

and 2) the application of

CERCLA, at least on the facts of this case, violates the Commerce
Clause... .'

In its decision, the court of appeals first addressed the threshold
question of CERCLA's constitutionality."8 Like the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit looked to the recent Supreme Court decision United
States v. Lopez1 for guidance on Congress's Commerce Clause power.
Both the appellate and district courts agreed that the starting point for
the analysis set out in Lopez is consideration of the areas Congress is
authorized to regulate under the Commerce Clause, which the Supreme
Court described as:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce ... i.e. those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.2'

Both courts also agreed that CERCLA's enactment should be analyzed
under the third category.2 1 Beyond this, however, the Lopez analysis
by the two courts differs in two important ways.

14.

107 F.3d at 1508.

927 F. Supp. at 1504.
107 F.3d at 1505.
927 F. Supp. at 1503.
107 F.3d at 1509.
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
20. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
21. 107 F.3d at 1599; 927 F. Supp. at 1531.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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With respect to the first of these differences, the district court asserted
that Lopez requires Congress to include in the statute a "jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
[statute] in question affects interstate commerce.'" 22 The court of
appeals, however, read Lopez as simply holding that the inclusion of a
jurisdictional element is one method Congress may use to ensure the
statute is applied constitutionally 3 When this jurisdictional element
is absent, the court of appeals ruled that courts must then make an
independent inquiry into whether the statute is a constitutional exercise
of power under the Commerce Clause.24
The Eleventh Circuit's more significant departure from the district
court was in the performance of this independent analysis to determine
if the ostensibly intrastate activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. 25 The court of appeals read Lopez as permitting a looser
connection between the intrastate activity and interstate commerce than
the district court,26 which read Lopez as requiring a direct connection
between not just an intrastate activity, but an intrastate economic
activity and interstate commerce. The district court did not find this
connection in the case at bar, and stated there was no "economic
activity" being regulated because Olin's facility was closed long ago.28
Additionally, the trial court stated, "[wlhile environmental degradation
generally may have an effect on interstate commerce, it is not clear to
this court that the degradation at issue in this case is necessarily
'economic activity' or that it has a 'substantial effect' on interstate
commerce."29 The court of appeals, however, took a less restrictive view
of the types of activities targeted by the statute, describing the test as:
whether the statute regulates "activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affect [ I interstate commerce." Lopez, [514]
U.S. at [549], 115 S. Ct. at 1631. This determination turns on whether
the statute constitutes "an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut

22. 927 F. Supp. at 1533 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
23. 107 F.ad at 1510.
24. Id.
25. Although the district court stated the absence of a jurisdictional element should be
fatal, it still performed the analysis by examining the connection between the statute and
interstate commerce. 927 F. Supp. at 1533.
26. 107 F.3d at 1510.
27. 927 F. Supp. at 1531.
28. 1d. at 1532.
29. Id. at 1533.
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unless the intrastate activity were regulated." Id. A court's focus,
10
thus, cannot be excessively narrow ....
Applying this broader test to CERCLA, the Eleventh Circuit's first
step was to identify the activity CERCLA purported to regulate. 3 The
court found it unnecessary to describe all the activities touched by the
statute, and instead looked at the "narrowest, possible class" of activity
regulated by the statute, which it identified as the on-site disposal of
hazardous waste.3 2 The court's next step was to determine whether the
on-site disposal of hazardous waste substantially affects interstate
commerce. In this step, the court found ample evidence in CERCLA's
legislative history that "the unregulated management of hazardous
substances, even strictly within individual states, significantly impacts
interstate commerce. .. ."" This evidence included data on agricultural losses and threats to the commercial fishing industry due to the
improper disposal of hazardous substances as well as information on the
significant costs to industry associated with the proper disposal of
hazardous substances. 4 Thus, despite the appellee's argument that no
evidence existed in this particular case to show that the on-site disposal
of hazardous substances had any affect on interstate commerce, the
Eleventh Circuit held CERCLA's application was constitutional because
CERCLA's "regulation of intrastate, on-site waste disposal constitutes an
appropriate element of Congress's broader scheme to protect interstate
commerce and industries thereof from pollution."3 5
In addition, although the appellate court ruled that it was not
required to do so under Lopez, it also found that the on-site disposal of
hazardous substances was, in fact, an "economic activity." 6 This
finding was based on the theory that "to the extent a chemical plant can
dispose of its waste on-site free of regulation, it would have a market
advantage over chemical companies that lack on-site disposal options." 7 Consequently, under its own analysis as well as the district
court's analysis, the court of appeals found that, "as applied in this case,
CERCLA constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause." 8

30. 107 F.3d at 1509.

31. Id at 1510.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.

Id. at 1511.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Having rejected the district court's holding that CERCLA violated the
Commerce Clause, the court of appeals turned to the lower court's
decision that the statute should not apply retroactively. Again, both
courts based their respective decisions on the same Supreme Court
decision, Landgraf v. USI Film Products,9 which explained the test
used to determine whether a statute applies retroactively:
[w]hen a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in
suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has
expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done
so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When,
however, the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect,
i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.'
Both the district and appellate courts divided the first task into two
parts, requiring initially a search of the text for an express statement of
the statute's retroactivity and, if none could be found, then requiring a
broader examination of the text and legislative history for guidance on
Congress's intent.4 '
Applying this two-step test to CERCLA, the district court first found
that "CERCLA contains no language explicitly stating it is retroactive."42 Next, examining the text of the statute for evidence of
Congress's intent, the court found the liability provisions of CERCLA,
sections 106 and 107, contained "no language indicating congressional
intent to authorize relief that is retroactive.' 3 As for the legislative
history of CERCLA, the district court concluded:
[tihe most that can be said from the legislative history is that Congress
left many questions, including retroactivity, as open ones to be decided
later. Like Landgraf, the circumstances surrounding passage of
CERCLA strongly suggest that the failure expressly to prescribe the
reach of the statute was deliberate on Congress' part."

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

511 U.S. 244 (1994).
Id. at 280.
927 F. Supp. at 1511; 107 F.3d at 1512-13.
927 F. Supp. at 1512.
Id. at 1513.

44. Id. at 1515.
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Having determined that Congress gave no clear indication of its intent
concerning retroactivity, the district court then determined that, under
the facts of this case, applying CERCLA would have a retroactive effect,
because it would hold Olin liable for actions it took before CERCLA's
enactment. 45 As a result, the district court applied the traditional
presumption against retroactivity and refused to find Olin liable for
actions taken prior to 1980.46
As stated above, the court of appeals agreed that the test laid out in
Landgraf controlled, and thus the court first looked for an express
provision of retroactivity in the statute.47 Finding none, the Eleventh
Circuit then looked for evidence of congressional intent in the statute's
text and legislative history.48 Unlike the district court, however, the
court of appeals found clear legislative intent in both the text of the
statute and the legislative history.4"
The appellate court cited textual examples of Congress's intent that
the statute apply retroactively from three different sections of the act.
The court first pointed to section 107(a), CERCLA's primary liability
section, which makes liable "any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any such facility" at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of.05 The court concluded
that, because the language of the statute imposes liability on both
current and former owners and operators of facilities, "Congress
manifested a clear intent to reach conduct preceding CERCLA's
enactment."5'
The Eleventh Circuit next looked to section 103(c) which states,
[w]ithin one hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, any
person who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal owned or
operated... a facility at which hazardous substances ... are or have

been stored, treated, or disposed of shall... notify the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of such facility
52

Regarding this provision, the court explained,

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1519.
107 F.3d at 1512.
Id. at 1512-13. The court also examined the "structure and purpose" of the statute,

although Landgraf does not appear to endorse this method of determining congressional
intent. Id. at 1513-14.
49. Id. at 1513-15.
50. Id. at 1513 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2)).
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
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[read reasonably, the foregoing subsection addresses conduct that
occurred before CERCLA's effective date. It expressly mandates that
persons who were former owners and operators as of December 11,
1980, make the required notification regarding their pre-enactment
conduct .... If, as Olin asserts, these former owners and operators
faced no liability under section 107, section 103 makes virtually no
sense. We conclude the language of section 103 confirms that Congress
believed its imposition of liability for cleanup upon former owners and
operators in section 107(a) covered persons who were former owners
and operators on December 11, 1980, as well as owners and operators
who sold their interests after that date.53
Finally, the appellate court cited section 107(f)(1), which expressly
precludes retroactive liability for natural resource damages.54 This
provision expressly states, "[there shall be no recovery under... this
section where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance
from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before
Regarding this provision, the court stated,
December 11, 1980."
"Congress's decision to include an express limitation on retroactivity in
the natural resource damage provision, but not in the adjacent response
cost subsection further shows its intent to impose retroactive liability for
6
remediation."
In addition to the foregoing examples of textual evidence of Congress's
intent, the court also found support in what it considered to be a wealth
of legislative history underlying CERCLAs enactment.5 7 Unlike the
district court, which looked only to the legislative history of the bill that
Congress finally enacted, the court of appeals employed the wider
legislative history surrounding the previous versions of CERCLA,
asserting that "the cleanup liability provisions from [the earlier versions
of the bill] were incorporated into CERCLA," and that "careful scrutiny
of the legislative record leading up to CERCLAs passage reveals that
the compromise never turned upon the statute's imposition of retroactive
liability for cleanup ... ."' After examining this broader legislative
history, the Eleventh Circuit found that, while the predecessor bill did

53. 107 F.3d at 1513.
54. Id. at 1513 n.17.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f(1).

56. 107 F.3d at 1513 n.17. The court further stated that "[a]lthough the Landgrafcourt
declined to place substantial weight on negative inferences" in the statute in question
there, the court " ' did not preclude all future use of a negative inference analysis in support
of retroactive intent.'" Id. (quoting Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 693 (D.
Nev. 1996)).
57. Id. at 1513-14.
58. Id. at 1514.
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not contain an express statement of retroactive liability, "'all those
commenting on [it and the parallel House bill] expressed the belief that
the bills would apply retroactively to those responsible for the releases
in existing waste sites.' 5 9
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Olin appears unquestionable in its
two fundamental holdings that (1) CERCLA clearly regulates activity
with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and (2) Congress did,
in fact, intend the statute to have retroactive effect. However, these two
explicit conclusions point to a more subtle question unanswered by the
decision concerning whether CERCLA's retroactive liability scheme,
when viewed in isolation, can withstand scrutiny under the Commerce
Certainly, the Eleventh Circuit's "economic advantage"
Clause.
argument makes sense when Congress is regulating activity on a
forward-going basis. However, retroactive application by definition has
little impact on a party's behavior in the present. Thus, it does not seem
essential to apply CERCLA retroactively to avoid creating an incentive
to pollute because CERCLA's forward-looking operation penalizes this
type of behavior. Indeed, retroactive operation of CERCLA could be
argued to have the opposite effect of placing companies that happen to
have historical operations captured by the retroactive liability scheme
at a disadvantage relative to new companies (or even reorganized
companies) that have no such history. Further, it could be argued that
CERCLA's retroactive application is merely a cost-shifting device rather
than an integral component of a larger scheme. Accordingly, it seems
unclear whether Olin will prove to be the final word on retroactive
application of CERCLA.
II.

CLEAN WATER ACT

The following discussion of Clean Water Act ("CWA") cases is divided
into three sections. The first section looks at a case brought under the
citizen suit provision of the CWA, challenging the EPA's failure to
review a potential change in water quality standards.' The second
section concerns a suit instituted by the government for a violation of
section 404, which focuses on the proper statute of limitations applicable
to the EPA's equitable claims. 61 Finally, the third section examines a
criminal prosecution of two individuals for violations of the CWA that
included a ruling on the breadth of the waters covered by the CWA.62

59. Id. (quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 662

(N.D. Ind. 1996)).
60. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
61. United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997).
62. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
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A.

Citizen Suit
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States' concerned passage by
the Florida Legislature of the Everglades Forever Act ("EFA")," which
the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the "Tribe") alleged changed
Florida's water quality standards for the Everglades. The Florida
legislature's express intent in passing the EFA was to clean up, restore,
and preserve the water quality and water quantity in the Everglades
through the implementation of a comprehensive program." If, in fact,,
Florida's passage of the EFA did change the water quality standards, the
CWA requires that "such revised or new standard shall be submitted to
the Administrator" for mandatory review." Florida, however, did not
submit the EFA to the EPA for review because the state believed the
EFA did not change the water quality standards but, rather, merely
provided a mechanism "to restore and maintain the ecosystem in the
Everglades." 7 Accepting the state's assessment that the statute did
not change the water quality standards, the EPA never reviewed the
EFA. Asserting that the EPA was without authority not to review the
EFA, the Tribe brought a citizens suit against EPA under section
1365(a)(2) alleging the "failure of the Administrator to perform any act
or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."68

The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, finding that the EPA had discretion in determining whether
to treat the EFA as a change in water quality standards and that the
Tribe could not sue under the CWA to enforce a discretionary power.69
The district court stated that the EPA "merely retained a supervisory
role of reviewing the state's [water quality standards] submissions. The
Administrator's review of the state water quality standards ... is almost
entirely dependent upon the state's own assessment." 0 Because
Florida determined that the EFA did not change the water quality
standards and thus did not submit anything to the EPA, the court found
that the EPA's nondiscretionary duty to review proposed changes was
never triggered.7
63. 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4592 (West 1998).
65. Id. § 373.4592(1XdXe).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

33 U.S.C. § 1313(cX2), (3) (1986 & Supp. 1998).
105 F.3d at 601.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, finding
that "Florida's failure to submit any new or revised standards cannot
circumvent the purpose of the CWA .... Even if a state fails to submit
new or revised standards, a change in state water quality standards
could invoke the mandatory duty imposed on the Administrator to
review new or revised standards."72 Due to the EPA's failure to
conduct this independent investigation concerning the EFA, the record
contained no evidence of whether the EFA actually changed the water
quality standards. The court held that until this factual determination
was made and it was clear whether the Administrator's nondiscretionary
duty to review a change in water quality standards had arisen, the suit
could not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 73
The case appears to be one of first impression on this issue. Its
holding seems to place a heavy obligation on the EPA, under certain
circumstances, to conduct a review of laws that might have the effect of
changing water quality standards, even if the state does not believe the
law affects the water quality standards and thus does not submit the
proposed changes to EPA.
Statute of Limitations
In United States v. Banks,74 the Army Corps of Engineers (the
"Corps") sued Banks, a real estate developer, asserting that for more
than a decade he had engaged in filling lots on an island off the coast of
Florida without a permit, despite five administrative orders from the
Corps to cease. The Corps sued for civil penalties, an injunction against
future filling, and an order for the defendant to restore the wetlands to
their original, undisturbed condition. The district court held in favor of
the Corps, and the court of appeals affirmed.75
The decision revolved around the statute of limitations applicable to
the Corps' request for equitable relief. Regarding the claim for civil
penalties, the court of appeals held that, because the CWA does not
specify a statute of limitations for enforcement actions, the default five
year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 should apply.76
This portion of the Code states, "[elxcept as otherwise provided by Act
of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be
entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the
B.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997).
I& at 917-18.
Id. at 918.
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claim first accrued."77 Having determined the statute of limitations
applicable to the civil penalties, the court then had to settle whether this
default statute of limitations was also applicable to the equitable relief
sought by the Corps.
The court of appeals gave two reasons in support of its decision that
the five-year statute of limitations did not apply to the Corps' claims for
equitable relief.7" First, the court noted, "[tiraditionally 'statutes of
limitation are not controlling measures of equitable relief.'"79 Second,
it also found that "[tihe plain language of section 2462 does not apply to
equitable remedies."80 The court, however, also confronted Banks's
argument that the "concurrent remedy rule" should govern the case and
bar equitable relief as well as the legal relief.8 This judicially created
rule of construction provides that "'equity will withhold its relief...
where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent
legal remedy.'8 2
In answer to Banks's contention, the court cited another rule of
judicial construction that provides, "'an action on behalf of the United
States in its governmental capacity ... is subject to no time limitation,
in the absence of congressional enactment clearly imposing it . . .,."
Balancing these two rules, the court found the latter to be controlling
and held that:
the properly constructed rule is that-absent a clear expression of
Congress to the contrary-a statute of limitation does not apply to
claims brought by the federal government in its sovereign capacity.
The statue is enforced against the government only when the government is acting to vindicate private interests, not a sovereign or public
interest.84
Thus, the court concluded, the Corps's claims for equitable relief were
not barred because Congress had not expressed a clear intention that
any statute of limitations was to apply to these claims. In so holding,
the court disagreed with the only two other courts that have addressed
the concurrent remedy rule in the CWA context, thereby overruling an

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 919 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Cope v, Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)).
Id (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)).
Id

19981
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earlier decision from the Northern District of Georgia in United States

v. Windward Properties,Inc."5
C.

CriminalProsecution

5 EPA brought criminal charges against
In United States v. Eidson,"
defendants who owned and operated a used oil recycling and wastewater
disposal business. Defendants allegedly discharged a sludge substance
from a company truck into a storm sewer that flowed into a drainage
ditch, then into a drainage canal, and then into Tampa Bay.87 They
were convicted in the district court of violating the CWA by knowingly
discharging a pollutant into navigable waters of the United States.8
They appealed their convictions, claiming the man-made drainage ditch

85. 821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that the concurrent remedy rule applied
to bar the government's claim for equitable relief); United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F.
Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995). The court of appeals did not fully explain its preference for
what might be termed the "sovereign capacity" rule over the concurrent remedy rule.
However, a possible explanation can be found in the district court decision in Federal
Election Comm'n v. ChristianCoalition,965 F. Supp. 66 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which concerned
the application of the concurrent remedy rule in the context of a government suit for
equitable and legal relief brought under the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"). The
court stated that the Supreme Court cases supporting the application of the concurrent
remedy rule, Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) and Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280
(1940), are inapplicable to an action brought by the federal government under a federal
statute for three reasons. The first two reasons are because neither Cope nor Russell
"involved a limitation on an action by the United States" and because "both cases involved
the interplay between federal rights and state statutes of limitations-issues not present
in a suit brought (by the federal government under a federal statute]." 956 F. Supp. at 71.
The third reason cited by the court concerns the original purpose of the concurrent remedy
rule, which was to bar the equitable remedy when it was sought only in aid of or to
supplement the legal remedy. If, however, the equitable remedy could have been sought
on its own, the statute of limitations applicable to the legal remedy will not bar the
equitable relief sought. Id. Therefore, under the FECA, the granting of equitable relief is
not barred by the statute of limitations, because the Act gives the government "authority
to seek injunctive relief wholly separate and apart from its authority to seek a legal
remedy." Id. at 72. That the two remedies were sought together in the same suit does not
necessitate the application of the concurrent remedy rule so as to bar the issuance of
equitable relief. While the court of appeals in Banks did not go through this analysis in
its decision, the court's analysis in ChristianCoalition is applicable to the facts of Banks,
because under the CWA, as under the FECA, the government may seek injunctive relief
"wholly separate and apart" from seeking legal relief. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d).
86. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 1340.
88. Id.
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did not constitute "navigable waters" under the CWA and, therefore,
they could not be guilty of violating the CWA."
The CWA defines "navigable waters" broadly as "waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.'e ° Looking to earlier Eleventh
Circuit precedent, the court noted that "Congress intended the definition
of navigable waters under the Act 'to reach to the full extent permissible
under the Constitution.''
As the Supreme Court has explained, the
broad definition indicates "Congress chose to regulate waters that would
not be deemed navigable under the classical understanding of that
term."92 One way in which "navigable waters" under the CWA differs
from this classical understanding, the Eleventh Circuit explained, is that
the water does not have to be navigable-in-fact, as the drainage ditch
was not, for it to be governed by the CWA. 5 Rather, the "waters of the
United States" can include tributaries. The court stated:
[iut is by now well established that Congress intended to regulate the
discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to
waters affecting interstate commerce ....

In accordance with this

legislative intent, EPA has defined "waters of the United States" to
include tributaries to waters that "may be susceptible to use in
89. Id. The defendants also appealed their sentences, alleging that the district court
had improperly increased the offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at
1344. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's increase of the offense level and
thus the length of the sentences for two reasons. The appellate court first agreed there had
been an "ongoing, continuous or repetitive discharge' as required by the guidelines to
increase the offense level, because there had been another, similar discharge only a week
before the discharge that was observed by the police. Id. The court found these two
instances sufficient to constitute an ongoing and repetitive discharge which justified an
increase in offense level. See U.S,S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1XA) (1993). The court also noted that
the cleanup "required a substantial expenditure," another condition of the sentencing
guidelines. See id. § 2Q1.2(b)(3). Defendants argued this increase was improper, because
the majority of the cleanup had yet to occur and the court improperly used projected costs
as a basis to increase the sentences. 108 F.2d at 1344. The court disagreed, stating:
[w]e find it unlikely that Congress intended that a defendant guilty of serious
environmental contamination should receive a lesser sentence merely because the
conviction occurred before the appropriate environmental agency could undo the
harm. Such a reading would thwart Congress's intent to punish defendants
according to the level of environmental degradation caused by their criminal
offenses.
Id. Consequently, the court approved the district court's use of the projected costs in
determining the offense level. Id. at 1345.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
91. Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341 (quoting United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538
(11th Cir. 1983)).
92. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133
(1985)).
93. Id.
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interstate or foreign commerce" ... and courts repeatedly have
recognized that tributaries to bodies of water that affect interstate
commerce are "waters of the United States" protected by the CWA.
Given that the CWA covers tributaries, the court further reasoned that
"[there is no reason to suspect that Congress intended to regulate only
the natural tributaries of navigable waters. Pollutants are equally
harmful to this country's water quality whether they travel along manmade or natural routes." 5 Citing other cases in which man-made
conveyances have been held to be "waters of the United States," the
court held that the fact that the drainage ditch was a man-made
tributary to a larger body of water (Tampa Bay) did not exclude it from
the definition of "navigable waters."96
Finally, the court stated "there is no reason to suspect that Congress
intended to exclude from 'waters of the United States' tributaries that
flow only intermittently. Pollutants need not reach interstate bodies of
water immediately or continuously in order to inflict serious environmental damage." 7 Given its findings that a man-made, intermittently
flowing tributary can be a "water of the United States," the court of
appeals upheld defendants' convictions, finding:
[the] sewer, the ditch, and the canal were all part of a storm drainage
system that was designed to discharge storm water into Tampa Bay
We hold that this evidence is sufficient to establish that the
....
drainage ditch into which [the defendant] discharged its pollutants is
a tributary of Tampa Bay and is thus a "water of the United States"
under § 1362(7)."
The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in this broad view, which appears
to extend the reach of the CWA to any conveyance or body of water so
long as it ultimately reaches water navigable in the more traditional
sense. A majority of the circuits agree that a waterway does not have
to be navigable-in-fact in order to be a "navigable water" under the
CWA,99 and several courts have held that man-made conveyances are

94. Id. at 1341-42 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)).
95. Id. at 1342.
96. Id. (citing United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn.
1976); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974)).

97. Id.
98. Id. at 1342-43.
99. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); Quivira Mining Co. v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); Avoyelles

Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983); National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.
1979); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ashland
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"navigable waters.""° Thus, it appears the set of water bodies left out
of the navigable waters of the United States is small indeed.'0 1
III.

MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT

In a case that is really just the latest milepost in a dispute that has
raged for almost two decades, Sierra Club v. Martin,' the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether the Migratory Bird Treaty Act applies to
actions by the federal government. For more than twenty years, citizens
groups on one side, and the U.S. Forest Service and logging interests on
the other, have battled over the extent of logging that the federal
government will permit in the Chattahoochee and Oconee National
Forests in North Georgia. The Forest Service operates the various
national forests under its jurisdiction through management plans that
are developed pursuant to the National Forest Management Act
("NFMA"),"5 which include the periodic sale of timber rights to private
companies. In an attempt to halt or reduce logging in the national
forests in North Georgia various citizens groups in Georgia have fought,
both administratively and judicially, the implementation of the
management plans or have charged the Forest Service with taking
action without performing the requisite environmental studies."°
Environmental groups successfully obtained in 1993 a court order that
temporarily stopped logging on 22,059 acres of the Chattahoochee
National Forest, because the Forest Service had allegedly failed to
complete the environmental assessments required by the National
Environmental Policy Act 0" before deciding to cut and sell timber."°

Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
100. Weiszmann v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pozsgai, 1991 WL 111175 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 1991); United States v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); United States v. Holland, 373
F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
101. An example of a water body that might fall outside the definition of "waters of the
United States" is an isolated pond that has no connection to a stream, lake, or other water
body that comes under the definition and that does not affect interstate commerce.
Additionally, the regulations state that wastewater treatment systems and cropland that
has been converted to a water body are not waters of the United States. 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.3(s)(7).
102. 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997).
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
104. See id. See also John Harmon, Forest Service to Protect 82,000 acres in North
Georgia, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Apr. 3, 1986, at B3; Charles Seabrook, Suit Challenges
Logging Policy in National Forest,ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., May 2, 1992, at A3.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1995 & Supp. 1998).
106. Scott Bronstein & John Harmon, Suit Halts All Logging in Tallulah ForestArea,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 9, 1993, at D1; John Harmon, National Forests: Environmen-
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Turning to the specific statute at issue in Sierra Club v. Martin, the
MBTA is a criminal statute similar to the Endangered Species Act,0 7
except that its scope is limited to migratory birds. The central provision
of the MBTA provides:
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase,
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be
shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or
cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any
part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not
manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any
such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of
[several international conventions concerning the preservation of
migratory birds]. 08
This provision is enforced by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, a division of the Department of the Interior, and "any person,
association, partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions
of said conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to
comply with any regulation made pursuant to this subchapter" can be
punished through both misdemeanor criminal fines and imprisonment."° Additionally, any person who "shall knowingly (1) take by
any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to
sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or (2) sell, offer for sale, barter
or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be guilty of a felony .... ""0
The foregoing provisions expressly apply to persons, associations,
partnerships, and corporations. The central question raised in Sierra
Club v. Martin was whether the MBTA's reach extends to the federal
government.
The specific facts giving rise to the dispute in Sierra Club v. Martin
began in 1995 when the Forest Service offered for sale the right to cut
timber on seven parcels of land in the Chattahoochee and Oconee
National Forests."' This offer of sale came after each parcel had been
subject to the environmental assessment required under NEPA."2

talists Gaining Ground, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 10, 1994, at D1.
107.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1985 & Supp. 1998).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

16 U.S.C. § 703.
Id. § 707(a).
Id. § 707(b).
Sierra Club, 110 F.3d at 1552.
Id
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Seven environmental groups sued under the Administrative Procedure
Act,11 claiming that the decision to "allow timber cutting, logging,
clearcutting, road building, and related activities in the seven parcels"
violated the CWA, the MBTA, and the National Forest Management Act
("NFMA).114

The district court issued a preliminary injunction

against all timbercutting and roadbuilding activities and the sale of any
unsold parcels, because the court found a substantial likelihood that
plaintiffs would prevail on their claim that the Forest Service actions
violated the MBTA."5 This finding was based on evidence that the
Forest Service contracts with timber companies allowed timber cutting
during the migratory birds' nesting season and that logging during that
period would kill from 2,000 to 9,000 juvenile birds. The district court
stated:
the text of the statute proscribes any killing of any migratory bird.
Since the protection of migratory birds apparently was important
enough to Congress to proscribe any killing of any migratory bird, the

Court finds that the potential killing of 2,000 to 9,000 migratory birds
is more than sufficient to show significant irreparable harm.'

The appellate court reversed the district court's decision with regard
to MBTA, however, not because it differed with the district court's
findings regarding whether the potential deaths of migratory birds
constituted irreparable harm, but because it found that the "MBTA does
not apply to the federal government."1 7 Accordingly, the court
explained that because "no violation of the MBTA could occur by any
formal action of the Forest Service, the Forest Service may not be
enjoined under the APA.""8 In support of its holding, the appellate
court first noted:
[t]he MBTA, by its plain language, does not subject the federal
government to its prohibitions .... The MBTA is a criminal statute

113. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 &Supp. 1996). The APA provides a vehicle for persons
who are "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" taken pursuant to a statute to
file suit against the agency when the federal statute in question does not contain a citizen
suit provision. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West Supp. 1996). For further discussion on this issue,
see Sierra Club, 110 F.3d at 1554-55.
114. Sierra Club, 110 F.3d at 1552-53.
115. Id. at 1553. Five months after the issuance of this preliminary injunction based
on the MBTA, the district court issued a permanent injunction based on violations by the
Forest Service of NEPA and the NFMA. That injunction was still in place at the time of
writing. Id. at 1553 n.5.
116. Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

117. 110 F.3d at 1556.
118. Id
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making it unlawful only for persons, associations, partnerships, and
corporations to "take" or "kill" migratory birds. Moreover, there is no
expression of congressional intent which would warrant holding that
"person" includes the federal government, thus enabling the United
States to prosecute a federal agency, or a federal official acting in his
official capacity, for taking or killing birds and destroying nests in
violation of the MBTA."'
Citing the Endangered Species Act, which expressly includes
government agencies within its prohibition, the court explained that
"Congress has demonstrated that it knows how to subject federal
agencies to substantive requirements when it chooses to do so."" 2 The
court also noted that the MBTA was enacted after the NFMA which was
passed "'to conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply
"
' Thus, the court continued:
of timber for the people.'" 12
[iun light of that purpose, it is difficult to imagine that Congress
enacted the MBTA barely twenty years later intending to prohibit the
Forest Service from taking or killing a single migratory bird or nest "by
any means or in any manner" given that the Forest Services' authorization of logging on federal lands inevitably results in the deaths of
individual birds and destruction of nests. The application of the MBTA
to the federal government would have severely impaired the Forest
Service's ability to comply with the congressional directive to manage
the national forests for timber production."'
Finally, the court found that the NFMA and NEPA together ensure
that the Forest Service considers the impact of its land management on
migratory birds. 2 ' The NFMA requires the Forest Service to manage
its lands in order to "'maintain viable populations of existing native and
desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area,'"' 4 while
NEPA requires the Forest Service to perform an environmental
The court concluded that
assessment of its proposed actions. 25
"Congress intended that the Forest Service follow the NFMA's regulatory
process, rather than the MBTA's criminal prohibitions, in addressing
conservation of migratory birds." 2 "

119. Id. at 1555.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 1556 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978)).
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.19).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
126.

110 F.3d at 1556.
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The only other appellate court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
to directly address this issue agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the
MBTA is not applicable to the federal government 1 27 In February
1998, the U.S. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for certiorari in
that case. 2 In addition, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
issued an internal memorandum in April 1997 that states, "[ilt is the
position of the Federal Government that the prohibitions of the MBTA
do not apply to Federal agencies or their employees acting in their
official capacities."" Accordingly, at least in the absence of legislative
changes, it does not appear that the30MBTA creates any restraint on the
conduct of the federal government.1

127. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997). There is another circuit court case, however, that seems to imply that the Forest
Service must comply with the MBTA in developing its management plans, but it does not
hold this explicitly. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 116 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished order) (finding that the Forest Service had not adequately addressed whether
its management plan would violate the MBTA).
128. Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 118 S. Ct. 1035 (1998).
129. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Guidance on "Take" under Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
April 16, 1997.
130. While environmentalists may have lost a weapon in the fight against logging on
public lands, the Forest Service has recently introduced a plan to suspend construction of
logging roads in most national forests in the country. During the moratorium, the Forest
Service would be required to examine and promulgate rules dealing with new methods of
building logging roads. See Administration of the Forest Development Transportation
System, 63 Fed. Reg. 4350 (1998).

